What Went Wrong in Iraq, according to the Army
In light of the many bad moves by the U.S. in the occupation of Iraq, it's at least good to see the Army isn't blind to its mistakes:
"Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to return to work, and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill."
"Despite the virtual certainty that the military would accomplish the regime change, there was no plan for oversight and reconstruction."
"At first, the [Iraqi] people were anxious to get started and looked to the U.S. for assistance. They soon saw us as being unable or unwilling to get anything done."
"The visible clues that may have provided a detailed analysis on WMD production, research and development, or storage were either destroyed or carried away by the local populace."
(Excerpts from "U.S. Wanted to Avoid ’Occupier’ Label".)
"Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to return to work, and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill."
"Despite the virtual certainty that the military would accomplish the regime change, there was no plan for oversight and reconstruction."
"At first, the [Iraqi] people were anxious to get started and looked to the U.S. for assistance. They soon saw us as being unable or unwilling to get anything done."
"The visible clues that may have provided a detailed analysis on WMD production, research and development, or storage were either destroyed or carried away by the local populace."
(Excerpts from "U.S. Wanted to Avoid ’Occupier’ Label".)
// 11/27/2003 
